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It would be relatively easy, and with good reason, to assume that social trust is a normatively 35 
good value to promote within institutions. Trust encourages cooperation between actors, and 36 
thus normalises policies, practices and behaviours that tend to work for the social good of all 37 
people, rather than just individuals. To assume all of this would also be to assume that trust 38 
should, in aspiration at least, be central to public policy design. However, I argue in this 39 
conceptual paper that the competitive landscape of the English Further Education sector in the 40 
years since Incorporation does not lend itself to the values of cooperation and social good. The 41 
extent to which forced competition has become normalised has made concerns over financial 42 
health commonplace around the boardroom in FE Colleges. In this context, perhaps the benefits 43 
associated with building and maintaining trust in this context are problematic. Perhaps it is 44 
important to consider whether in fact, distrust is fundamental to institutional survival? This 45 
paper draws upon three key theoretical concepts from the trust literature to conceptualise how 46 
the Further Education policy environment could necessitate measures which enlist 47 
organisations and individual actors towards objectives which are increasingly linked to 48 
competition, centrally devised standards and institutional survival. In this way, I suggest in this 49 
paper that strategies of distrust may be of greater use in the design of institutional policy, as the 50 
need to establish control encourages self-interested practices which take primacy over 51 
cooperation. 52 
Key words: trust, distrust, neoliberalism, further education 53 
Introduction 54 
Leading a Further Education Institution is a treacherous activity, fraught with possible dangers and the 55 
ongoing battle to survive. In a competitive market place where resources are scarce, therefore, College 56 
principals are faced with little choice but to carry out their work with the brute force required to keep 57 
going in a sector where playing it safe is not an option. Damien Page (2017) would have us believe 58 
this to be the case; and as such he argues that principals are given an undue reputation as 59 
‘managerialist tyrants who plunder the pleasures of professionalism and autonomy from the people’ 60 
(ibid: 34). In constructing this argument, he names the conflict implicit in much of the FE research 61 
literature: the decline of trust between the leaders and the led. Further, the conceptualisation of a 62 
brutal, ‘lion-like’ principal provides us with an alternative understanding of leadership in practice. 63 
What if the act of distrusting is based on intention, rather than consequence?  64 
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 ‘What is often forgotten when people engage in disparaging commentary about 65 
principals1 is the indomitable power of the external environment…yes, principals 66 
make swingeing cuts to their staffing, and yes, they may impose contractual 67 
changes…and yes they may create teaching environments in which teachers are 68 
continually surveilled and evaluated. But let us remember that these are not voluntary 69 
acts of managerialist despotism… the principal’s sole responsibility is the survival of 70 
their college and the education of their students, if that is threatened it is incumbent 71 
upon them to take whatever action necessary’ (Page 2017: 35-36) 72 
The provocation made by Page (2017) here brings notions of trust and distrust into sharp focus. He 73 
makes explicit how uncertainty can shape leadership behaviour; particularly when their institution 74 
faces significant financial insecurity. In doing so, he exposes how an institution’s response to 75 
uncertainty influences perceptions of trust on both sides. Relationships based on trust tend to lead to 76 
harmonised workplaces which promote agency and cooperation. Indeed, management research has 77 
shown that trust is a crucial mediating factor in the smooth running of  an organisation; from 78 
industrial relations to perceptions of job security and employee wellbeing (Lewicki, Elgoibar, and 79 
Euwema 2016; Wang, Mather, and Seifert 2018). However, given the increasing precariousness of the 80 
environment in which the Further Education (FE) sector operates, it is worth considering whether the 81 
benefits associated with building and maintaining trust in this context are problematic. For example, 82 
agency can lead to risk-taking that could fail to meet the expectations of external auditors (ie, Ofsted). 83 
Similarly, policies predicated upon high trust (such as full-time permanent employment) are 84 
inefficient compared with casual labour, which allows institutions the flexibility to cope with the ebb 85 
and flow of an uncertain funding and policy environment. Perhaps it is important to consider whether, 86 
in fact, distrust is fundamental to institutional survival?  87 
In this paper, I will draw upon three theoretical concepts provided by the trust research literature to 88 
illustrate how concepts of trust and distrust can be understood from both a policy and organisational 89 
perspective. I will explore how the global trend towards economic advancement necessitates measures 90 
to position education and ‘skills’ as the solution to these problems; thus, actively shaping behaviour 91 
towards these objectives. In the act of problematizing our commonly perceived understanding of trust 92 
in this context, I will demonstrate how on a policy level, forms of low trust and distrust can be utilised 93 
to exert control over institutional and individual practice, but also how distrust can be reciprocated to 94 
resist control by those individuals who are subject to such power. In doing so, I will consider whether 95 
English Further Education policy is designed to create distrust, and if so, to what effect. It is important 96 
to note that instead of making claims of absolute truth, I intend that this paper will provoke debate. 97 
The purpose of this article is to stimulate thinking around the role of trust and distrust in educational 98 
                                                          
1 A principal is often also referred to as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
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leadership and governance, particularly in the context of economic austerity, and global 99 
competitiveness. If the sole job of a principal is indeed to ensure the survival of their college, then this 100 
exercise frames the lack of choice inherent within this context to explore how distrust effectively 101 
limits the capacity for choice; distrust grows where agency is limited.  102 
Page's (2017) chapter, In Defence of the Principal (see Daley, Orr, and Petrie 2017) is a provocative 103 
piece which is narrated from the perspective of a college principal, justifying the (often distrusting) 104 
behaviour that is perceived by staff from leadership. Whilst the chapter presents in many ways as a 105 
blunt instrument with which to point out the strategic and managerial failures of FE leadership, it at 106 
the same time creates a legitimate line of intellectual inquiry which this paper intends to explore. In 107 
doing so, it will posit that distrust fuels the increased and ongoing instability across the FE sector; 108 
created by a neoliberal policy environment which favours competition rather than cooperation. This 109 
competitive environment, coupled with political and financial uncertainty, steers the practice of 110 
college governance towards managing the huge risks, most of which are financial, associated with 111 
failing to ‘get it right’. Although this threat is very real, in part due to the ever-increasing scrutiny and 112 
‘intervention’ by the FE Commissioner (Hill, James, and Forrest 2016; J Burke 2018), the changing 113 
shape of governance in recent years has nevertheless been to the perceived detriment of those who are 114 
working at the ‘chalk-face’ (Hill 2000; Gleeson, Abbott, and Hill 2011); a shift that has been 115 
described as a move from trust to ‘mistrust’ by Thompson and Wolstencroft (2018). They argue that 116 
FE leaders have little say in the direction of their organisations due to heavy-handed political 117 
influence over vocational education strategy.  118 
The subject of this paper is timely, given the insolvency regime set to come into force in 2019; further 119 
increasing the burden of risk which will be imposed upon college corporation governing bodies. 120 
Although to date the number interventions by the FE Commissioner for financial concerns have been 121 
limited, the Department for Education have expressed their belief that this is set to increase three-fold 122 
in the wake of the insolvency regime (DfE 2018). Its forthcoming implementation has been attributed 123 
to the recent wave of resignations by prominent college leaders in anticipation of blame for 124 
mismanagement of funding (Burke 2018). Further, the explicit link between Ofsted grading and 125 
financial health reinforces the responsibilitisation of leadership in conforming to central objectives, 126 
and limits opportunities for delegation of authority to staff within Colleges.  127 
Instability and forced competition for the market-share of students has proved corrosive to building 128 
trust relationships amongst staff within Further Education Colleges (FECs). For example, research by 129 
Coffield et al. (2007) focuses on the lack of participation in the creation of policy design, whilst 130 
O’Leary’s (2015) research on graded teaching observation illustrates how instrumentalised pedagogy 131 
is to the detriment of teacher creativity and autonomy. Further, Boocock’s (2015; 2017) work on FE 132 
governance highlights the prevalence of leadership models which promote agent self-interest, and 133 
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Avis’ (2003) study on professional trust relations reflects how this combination of elements reinforces 134 
the performative nature of the institutional environment; leading to the construction of trust 135 
relationships which are conditional and based on the achievement of strategic objectives. This 136 
constitutes a weak and conditional form of trust which is intended to incentivise self-interested and 137 
individualist behaviour, known as transactional trust (Uslaner 2002).  138 
One of the issues that Andrew Boocock (2017) highlights is the use of Principal-Agent modes of 139 
governance in FE. The so-called P-A model assumes that individual ‘agents’ (ie, managers and 140 
lecturers) are self-interested and require incentives to meet governmental targets and thus conform to 141 
demands made of the ‘principal’. This model encourages staff within FECs to engage in gaming 142 
behaviours to secure funding. Not only does this undermine intrinsic motivations, but privileges 143 
conformity at the expense of staff agency and local decision-making. Guido Möllering (2006) further 144 
criticises the P-A model as it assumes trust to be a one-directional process, and does not account 145 
sufficiently for how the ‘agent’ (or trustee) is likely to respond, or indeed, how likely they are to 146 
reciprocate trust based on the incentives provided.  147 
‘An effective policy of localism will require a significant shift away from the current low-148 
trust principal-agent solutions manifest in funding and monitoring systems, driven by 149 
marketization, managerialism, ‘targets and terror’ (Boocock 2017: 308) 150 
Intrumentalisation of self-assessment and rigidity of Ofsted grading criteria indicates the level of 151 
conformity required to achieve security, which Boocock (2013) argues is to the expense of 152 
meaningful critical reflection in pursuit of favourable Ofsted grades. 153 
Problemetizing Notions of Trust and Distrust  154 
There is a consensus amongst trust researchers that the capacity to trust hangs upon a few key 155 
concepts including: competence, benevolence, integrity and reciprocity (Skinner, Dietz, and Weibel 156 
2014; Lyon, Möllering, and Saunders 2016). The decision to accept such vulnerability is based on an 157 
assessment of whether the other potential ‘trustee’ has the ability to be trusted (competence), whether 158 
they have the ‘trustor’s’ best interests at heart (benevolence) and whether they are honest about their 159 
intentions (integrity) (see Lewicki and Brinsfield 2016). These are qualities which are shaped strongly 160 
by perception, and whether the act of trusting another will be reciprocated (Sztompka 2008). The act 161 
of trusting therefore constitutes a ‘leap of faith’ on the part of the ‘trustor’ that the ‘trustee’ will not 162 
betray them (Möllering 2006). Therefore, conflicts in vision and purpose could lead individuals to 163 
question the best interests of other parties. 164 
In the FE sector, the question of vision and purpose is a fraught debate. Such debate sits within an 165 
ideological landscape encompassing a broad range of stakeholders internally (students, lecturers, 166 
leadership teams) and externally (employers, funding bodies, trade unions, membership organisations, 167 
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local and national government). Each party is motivated by different intrinsic and extrinsic factors, 168 
which are often at odds with the wants and needs of the other players in the environment. This has 169 
created fertile ground for fractious, low-trust relationships to emerge between those that create policy, 170 
those that implement policy, and those that are the subject to such policy.   171 
The business principles of efficiency and educational principles of inclusion and social justice play 172 
out in an environment of conflicting interests; leading to a cycle of binary thinking in which those 173 
who implement policy (leadership) and those subject to policy (staff) have often found themselves 174 
either side of the ideological divide. This in effect precludes the possibility of either party taking the 175 
‘leap of faith’ required to trust. The next section of this paper will use the theoretical literature on trust 176 
to explore how the evolution of policy has contributed to the creation of a low trust environment 177 
within FE organisations.  178 
The Evolution of Distrust in FE Policy 179 
Since 1992, the English Further Education system has been subject to sustained cuts in government 180 
funding (IFS 2018), as well as systematic deregulation; forcing Further Education Colleges (FECs) to 181 
operate within a ‘quasi-market’ competing with other FECs for funded student places, and thus, 182 
financial stability. The previous Liberal-Democrat-Conservative Coalition Government (2010-2015) 183 
and the current Conservative Government’s austerity strategies have been particularly aggressive, and 184 
there have been no signs of the Government slowing down its approach to this already impoverished 185 
sector since. As such, cuts to courses, departments and redundancy have become an everyday feature 186 
of working within the Further Education environment (O’Leary and Rami 2017). 187 
Successive governments have become increasingly instrumentalist in their approach to FE policy. 188 
Provision which had largely been provided locally by Local Education Authorities (LEAs) and 189 
voluntary groups became increasingly rationalised and audited. The 1992 Further and Higher 190 
Education Act was the tipping point in the evolution of instrumentalism, audit and free market 191 
competition. The removal of the sector from LEA control forced Further Education Colleges (FECs) 192 
to compete with other colleges for funding in a competitive ‘quasi-market’, which was centrally 193 
administered through the newly-established Further Education Funding Council (FEFC)2. The council 194 
imposed strict conditions for funding (Bailey and Unwin 2014) and its function served to extend 195 
accountability into central government (Lucas and Crowther 2016). The increased autonomy afforded 196 
to institutions allowed the government to disassociate from the practices of individual organisations. 197 
Although it has been argued by Lucas and Crowther (2016: 587) that the need for change in the FE 198 
sector was justified, it was the ‘dominant political belief by government at the time in a competitive 199 
                                                          
2 Since 1992, further education funding bodies have gone under several iterations, which is currently 
the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA) 
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market that formed the basis of incorporation’. It is therefore the long-term impact of this ideological 200 
position, rather than the need for change itself, which has rippled through the sector since.  201 
The drive towards competition was guided by the neoliberal principle that the freedom afforded by 202 
de-regulation would permit opportunities to test, try and fail on the assumption that high quality 203 
service would be guided by the free market. Given the perceived lack of importance of the further 204 
education and skills sector, FE was ripe for this kind of experimentation (Keep 2006). Providers were 205 
forced to compete with neighbouring institutions, which brought with it an aggressive form of 206 
individualism (Finlay and Finnie 2002; Ball 2005). The upshot of the forced competition imposed by 207 
the Act led to budgetary deficits within FECs, which diverted attention away from pedagogical 208 
matters to excessive administration (Keep 2006). Job losses, the casualization of employment, and 209 
reductions in conditions of service and pay led to substantial industrial unrest (Williams 2003), which 210 
has seen a recent resurgence as the impact of austerity bites harder than ever in colleges across 211 
England (O’Leary and Rami 2017).  212 
In the thirty years since Incorporation, the sector has faced some of the most dramatic and rapid 213 
policy change globally (Keep 2015), serving to keep the FECs along with their many and various 214 
stakeholders in a constant state of flux. This chaotic environment has resulted in a decline in 215 
collective identity and shared values base which would allow those who work in FE to have a 216 
common understanding of its role and purpose in society (Lucas and Crowther 2016; Duckworth and 217 
Smith 2018). The ‘local knowledge’ of educators became de-valued by managers due to a centralised 218 
preoccupation with meeting targets (Smith and O’Leary 2013); exposing the conflicting interests 219 
between policymakers, the implementers of policy and the subject of policy. The All Change report 220 
produced by the Institute for Government (2017) attributed policy churn to a conflict in perceived 221 
purpose of FE and the high levels of discretion ministers have in making changes to the system.  222 
The fundamental difference in value-orientation amongst the actors at play continue to increase the 223 
distance between those who lead and govern FE institutions, and those who learn and work within 224 
them (Boocock 2011). These insecure work environments heightened anxieties and insecurities 225 
amongst staff members and reduced professional autonomy and trust in the employer-employee 226 
relationship (Williams 2003).  227 
Presently, the strain upon these professional relationships is tightening as disputes over pay get louder 228 
(Burke 2018), and ever-more lecturers consider leaving the profession (Jones 2015). A recent 229 
workforce survey by the Association of Colleges reported an overall 17.8% sector staff turnover rate 230 
for the year 2016/17. Whilst 42% of management staff and 48% of teaching staff did not report a 231 
reason for resignation, staff at 80% of Colleges reported stress and mental ill health as a main reason 232 
for sickness absence. Further, 61% of Colleges reported compulsory redundancies (AoC 2017). The 233 
report suggests makes explicit the fragile environments in which staff in FE are working, contributing 234 
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to the strain created by high stakes policy. 235 
A study of note by Wang, Mather, and Seifert (2018) into job insecurity in the UK (in particular post-236 
2008 financial crisis) found that collective trust in management was a key mediating factor in 237 
softening feelings of job insecurity and anxiety during times of uncertainty. In particular, the study 238 
posited that the notion of ‘hidden job insecurity’ (characterised by the loss of ‘valued job features’ 239 
such as pay or responsibility) played an important role in feelings of commitment towards an 240 
organisation. Within the FE context, it is possible to argue that professionalism and autonomy are 241 
abstract ‘valued job features’ which have been lost (Thompson and Wolstencroft 2018), and are 242 
currently mitigating against institutional commitment and loyalty in the retention of educators in FE, 243 
leaving the ‘job survivors’ to do more with fewer resources (ibid).  244 
Social Traps and Institutional Trust  245 
The ongoing conflict between unions and policy-makers exposes the breakdown of trust between 246 
employees, institutions and government. Bo Rothstein’s (2005; 2013) notion of the ‘Social Trap’, 247 
illustrated in Figure 1, helps us to understand how the policy churn and its subsequent implementation 248 
in FECs can be understood. A ‘social trap’ is a process whereby distrust is perpetuated on the basis 249 
that all other actors also believe that others will choose to distrust. According to Rothstein 250 
(2013:1021) ‘people have no choice but to make judgements based on the imperfect information that 251 
is available to them’. This ‘imperfect’ information informs perceptions, and thus can influence the 252 
behaviour of individuals towards each other. Therefore, perception becomes a force which perpetuates 253 
a ‘trap’ of weak trust. 254 
[Insert Figure 1 here: The Social Trap: Policy, Practice and Distrust in FE (adapted from Rothstein 255 
2005)] 256 
Figure 1, therefore, allows us to understand how the perpetual reinforcement of high risk and low 257 
trust relates to Ewart Keep’s (2006: 52) assertion that constant government intervention in the FE 258 
context has led to policy stagnation, in which the power of the state is reproduced and reinforced by 259 
political short-termism. 260 
‘a cycle of state intervention [forces central government] to intervene further in order to shore 261 
up earlier interventions, targets and policy goals; and this process in turn is driving a 262 
continuous reproduction and strengthening of state power within the Education and Training 263 
system’ (Keep, 2006: 52) 264 
Keep (2006) further argues that the state secures its control over the market by using various agencies 265 
as enforcers, of which Ofsted, the FE Commissioner and the Education and Skills Funding Agency 266 
(ESFA) are currently key players. Therefore, the centrally derived need to control institutions makes it 267 
common sense for College leaders to shape the behaviour of employees towards governmental 268 
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objectives. The best way to regulate behaviour of Colleges is to actively, and increasingly, distrust 269 
College leadership through the use of strategic policy intervention. In his critique of Ofsted, Coffield 270 
(2017) demonstrated that in some cases, school leaders welcomed regular visits from the inspectorate 271 
as they believed it supported them to push staff into altering their practices. Through the concept of 272 
the ‘social trap’, we can understand the need to ‘push’ in such a way arises when the stakes are high. 273 
Authoritarian tactics such as this then become necessary; contributing to high levels of distrust over 274 
time. Once distrust has been established, it can be difficult to escape the trap that is created by it 275 
(Rothstein 2005). 276 
Conceived in this way, the ‘social trap’ of distrust in policy design described in Figure 1 becomes a 277 
cyclical process which is perpetually reinforced in spite of itself.  While the policy surge goes on, the 278 
critiques of it tend not to change. Instead, the constant churn of policy keeps the conditions ripe for 279 
uncertainty, while performative practice within institutions becomes embedded. When risk is 280 
introduced at every stage in the process, behaviour becomes easier to manipulate (Avis 2003).  281 
Lazzarato (2009) contends that what lies at the heart of neoliberalism is not capital, but competition. 282 
Thus, for neoliberalism to survive, the conditions for competition need to be created, leaving 283 
individual actors and institutions vulnerable to ‘losing’. In creating levers which manipulate 284 
behaviour, the assumption is that individuals will act to protect themselves against uncertainty 285 
(Boocock 2015).  In this sense, neoliberalism not only dictates what educationalists do, it becomes 286 
what educationalists do. Ball and Olmedo (2013: 85) state that “[neoliberalism] speaks and acts 287 
through our language, our purposes, decisions and social relations”. As such staff are at risk of 288 
becoming subject, rather than subjective.  289 
The stream of policy which has been implemented since Incorporation has been predicated upon a low 290 
trust a relationship with FECs, in which trust is conditional upon FECs meeting increasingly narrow 291 
targets. FECs are now solely responsible for success or failure. As such, falling success rates are the 292 
responsibility of individual teachers, just as failure to succeed is the responsibility of the student 293 
(Finlay et al 2007). Boocock (2015: 728) argues that ‘funding and targets are two of the most 294 
powerful levers’ used in government policy to meet retention and achievement targets on an 295 
institutional level, whilst keeping day to day governance at a distance. Top-down policy reforms 296 
assume certain levels of ‘self-interest’ (Boocock 2017) which allows the government to assert control 297 
under conditions of apparent ‘freedom’ (Steer et al. 2007). Coffield (2007) has argued that the use of 298 
such ‘steering mechanisms’ makes the need to control education professionals explicit.  299 
The policy strategies taken on by institutions meant that students from disadvantaged backgrounds 300 
were less valued under this new economic framework of education (Boocock 2015), demonstrating 301 
decreased trust in students as well as staff. As Smith (2007: 43) has reflected in his work on the 302 
impact of the ‘quasi-market’ environment, ‘the “preferred student” carries no baggage, needs no extra 303 
 10 
support… is predictable in being able to achieve accreditation’ (emphasis added). This need to predict 304 
outcomes for students demonstrates why a low-trust environment becomes essential to institutional 305 
survival in a competitive market.  306 
The externalisation of quality assurance, and what constitutes quality also allows the state to impose 307 
punitive penalties upon those providers who do not meet the appropriate levels of ‘rigour’ and 308 
‘standards’. Illsley and Waller (2017) contend that the standards agenda curbed much of the 309 
discussion regarding curriculum development and practice, which in effect led to an increasing focus 310 
on ‘college’ needs rather than ‘student’ needs. In doing so, it set the template for establishing control 311 
on an institutional level. In essence, autonomy is afforded upon very specific terms. Therefore, the 312 
need for an institution to survive takes primacy over the needs of students.  313 
This problem was exposed by the Wolf Review (Wolf 2011), a report which accused colleges of 314 
cynically chasing funding from an ever-shrinking pot to provide 16-19 year-olds with ‘inferior’ low-315 
level qualifications of little value; a practice which Allan (2017) argues has increased since the raising 316 
of the participation age in post-compulsory education. Smith (2007) refers to this kind of practice as 317 
the ‘ducking and diving’ nature of colleges, who to ensure institutional survival become preoccupied 318 
with self-interest. Therefore, through the lens of distrust, the recommendations of this report can be 319 
understood as an attempt to mitigate against a set of practices which were the result of assumed agent 320 
self-interest in (distrusting) institutional policy-making. The latest overhaul of FE provision has left 321 
the sector reeling with an ever-present sense of uncertainty, as the government turns its attention to 322 
reforming apprenticeship provision and prepares to roll out its flagship ‘T-Levels’ programme.  323 
Since 2015, the Conservative Government’s continuation of the austerity project has accelerated the 324 
skills agenda, coupled with crippling budget cuts. The report published by the Institute for Fiscal 325 
Studies captured a 40% reduction in funding over the last decade (IFS 2018). Colleges have struggled 326 
to stay afloat, often forced to merge with other providers in line with the Area Review process. The 327 
Area Reviews proposed a further ‘rationalisation’ of curriculum offer to focus on local and national 328 
industry needs whilst also maintaining ‘tight fiscal discipline’ in doing so (DBIS 2015). Further, the 329 
increased presence of the FE Commissioner and the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA) 330 
have forced Governing Boards in FE to become preoccupied by the precarity of their financial 331 
position to avoid the risk of college closure due to financial ill-health.  332 
The high risk policy environment, combined with a continuing austerity project (Ryan 2018), 333 
diminishes the capacity for FE organisations to enhance cooperation, creativity and autonomy 334 
amongst staff; factors which are key to building trust (Uslaner 2002; Rothstein 2013; Rothstein and 335 
Uslaner 2005). This has led Rothstein (2013) to assert that this is why the ‘fish rots from the head 336 
down’ in institutional hierarchies.  337 
‘Agents in a group that have lost trust in one another cannot easily mimic or fabricate the 338 
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level of trust needed to ensure collaboration, even if they all know that they would be better 339 
off if they could’ (Rothstein 2013:1012) 340 
New Public Management: self-interest, survival and distrust in the organisational context 341 
The discussion so far has demonstrated that the move towards free-market practice in the public sector 342 
has been accompanied by the rhetoric of individualism; incentivising self-interest through the creation 343 
of a high risk, high stakes environment. In order to manage this level of uncertainty, a new style of 344 
management has emerged. Commonly referred to in the literature as New Public Management (NPM), 345 
this style of management can be considered the backbone of a modern neoliberal state. According to 346 
Clarke and Newman (1997), ‘new managerialism’ made efficiency an imperative in public sector 347 
management: this would allow for the creation of a more efficient government at a reduced cost 348 
within a high stakes environment (Keep 2015; Vallentin and Thygesen 2017). Further, by relaxing 349 
regulation and reducing the power of the unions, NPM practices also supported managers to establish 350 
the ‘right to manage’. This so-called ‘right to manage’ is made legitimate by tools of audit and 351 
performance management.  352 
In practice, the NPM approach has changed the nature of leadership in education and other public 353 
sector organisations. Leadership roles which were traditionally the occupation of experienced 354 
educationalists and pedagogues, have now become occupied by experienced business managers: 355 
preferring the title of ‘Chief Executive’ rather than ‘Principal’. As such, the guiding principle of 356 
‘fairness’ which might have traditionally been attributed to the spirit of public service, have instead 357 
been gradually replaced by principles of ‘efficiency’ (Vallentin and Thygesin 2017). Smith and 358 
O’Leary (2013) have described how leadership under NPM represents a quest to seek ‘quantitative 359 
wholeness’, whereby the only data which is considered meaningful is translated through figures. They 360 
assert that ‘managerialist positivism… normalises the representation of complex sociological and 361 
qualitative phenomena in reductive and numerical forms’ (Smith and O’Leary 2013: 246). Not only 362 
does this approach reinforce hierarchical norms within institutions, but also valorises numerical data 363 
to the exclusion of complex ecologies of practice which form the basis of meaningful educational 364 
relationships.  365 
The distance that has been created between ‘those at the top’ and ‘those on the ground’ is stark, and 366 
O’Leary (2016: 10) contends that the work of principals has become so far removed from ‘the 367 
realities of what it means to be a practitioner that it is debatable whether they have the skills or 368 
knowledge base to support improvements in teaching and learning’. This lack of faith in leadership 369 
was demonstrated by Hill (2000) when his research into lecturer perceptions of leadership revealed 370 
that less than 50% of teachers surveyed felt that they were trusted by their Governors or their College 371 
Management Team. Further, over 50% of the respondents also reported that the (then) FEFC and the 372 
Department for Education at the time were ‘poor’ at representing their professional interests.  373 
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The distinction between Trust and Distrust in the organisational context   374 
The establishment of a centralised, hierarchical system of management has been to the detriment of a 375 
more democratic system which would have been more conducive to building trust relationships 376 
(Boocock 2015). For example, a research study conducted by Vallentin and Thygesin (2017: 151) 377 
attributes NPM to the dissolution of trust in Danish public services, stating that ‘NPM reforms have 378 
been blind to the value of cooperation across public agencies… undermining trust’. The assumption 379 
that those at the centre know best, with limited opportunity for agents to contribute to decision-380 
making or provide feedback is one of the central pillars of the system that has been created (Keep 381 
2015). The sentiment that ‘followers’ need only follow has been further echoed by Coffield (2017) in 382 
his work evaluating the evolution of Ofsted.  383 
In the organisational context, the work of Roy Lewicki and colleagues (Lewicki, Elgoibar, and 384 
Euwema 2016; Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies 1998) has illustrated that trust and distrust could be 385 
construed as two distinct concepts which can coexist within the same relationship. According to 386 
Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998), trust is based on the confident positive expectations of another 387 
person’s conduct, while distrust is defined as confident negative expectations of another’s conduct. 388 
Therefore, disposition towards both trust and distrust can influence the way an individual engages 389 
within an organisation. This complicates our understanding of low/weak trust and distrust. Low or 390 
weak trust is based on weak ties or lack of collaboration, yet can still be considered a form of trust. 391 
Distrust, however, constitutes an assumption of malfeasance on the part of the potential trustee; 392 
leading to assumptions of negative outcomes and harmful motives from the ‘trustor’s’ perspective. 393 
Therefore, in the case of distrust, risk management becomes an essential feature of practice within 394 
institutions. Management of potential risks allows college leaders to incentivise employees to 395 
conform, thus allowing them to trust them to perform despite the presence of distrust.  396 
According to Lewicki, McAllister and Bies (1998), the combination of ‘low trust’ and ‘high distrust’ 397 
in relationships leads to relations which are verified through the monitoring of ‘vulnerabilities’ and 398 
the reinforcement of ‘bounded relationships’. Therefore, the use of performance management and 399 
graded observations in FE could be construed as ‘low trust-high distrust’ tactics which result from a 400 
preoccupation with the risk and uncertainty created by the policy environment. This notion is reflected 401 
in the work of Thompson and Wolstencroft (2018) where they found that middle managers felt that 402 
they had been deceived as leadership fell through on their promises to afford them autonomy; instead 403 
enforcing the pursuit of corporate objectives.  404 
This conceptualisation of the role of trust and distrust in organisational relationships makes explicit 405 
how the use of distrust in policy design can create the trust necessary to meet centrally defined 406 
standards. This illustrates the logic that would underpin the deliberate use of high distrust policies 407 
(observation, inspection, audit and performance management), which would allow those that create 408 
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policy to control, as far as possible, the conditions within which individuals can work. The high risk 409 
and uncertainty that is created by neoliberal competitiveness ensures that the work of policy-makers is 410 
mediated successfully by those leadership teams; who in this context exist to implement the policy 411 
that has been created. In effect, distrust reinforces the manager’s right to manage. 412 
Trust and Moral Space: On the breaking of bonds  413 
According to Sztompka (2017: 4-7), trust is the cornerstone of what he refers to as the ‘moral space’ 414 
of social life. This space is characterised by six moral bonds, namely; ‘trust, loyalty, reciprocity, 415 
solidarity, respect and justice … [of which] trust has a special rank among them. It is most 416 
fundamental in the sense that all other bonds either presume or imply some measure of trust’ (ibid: 4). 417 
The relentless drive towards productivity and competition reflected in governmental priorities (those 418 
that create policy), and their use in practice (those that implement policy) constitutes a break of these 419 
moral bonds which would connect them to those who work in FE (the subject of policy). The act of 420 
severing these bonds creates an environment in which reparation becomes difficult. If we can 421 
understand the decision to trust as requiring the trustor to be vulnerable, then it is possible to 422 
understand why trust is so much more difficult to repair than it is to lose, as it is the willingness to be 423 
vulnerable that makes trust such an elusive concept (Sztompka 2008; Rothstein 2005; Lewicki et al 424 
2016).  425 
Neoliberal policy and NPM therefore represent the antithesis of the bonds of solidarity, respect and 426 
reciprocity which according to Sztompka (2017) are so crucial in the creation of trusting relationships. 427 
In such an unstable and hostile policy environment (Lucas and Crowther 2016), where the stakes are 428 
high, all bets are off. Instead, it has been argued that in FE, risk is ‘passed down the social structure so 429 
that the costs are often carried by those who are placed at the base of organisational hierarchies’ (Avis 430 
2003: 329). This risk is organisational, as well as individual due to the ‘high stakes’ environment in 431 
which teaching currently takes place (O’Leary 2015).  432 
In a context where institutional trust is low, and the risks are high, it makes more sense to distrust than 433 
to trust. In this way, conditional outputs are filtered through the structure from the top of the 434 
hierarchy, starting with Government policy. Simply put, controlling those subject to policy is easier 435 
than trusting them. Control ‘reduces complexity by regulating the number of possible outcomes’ 436 
(Vallentin and Thygesin (2017: 154). This is compatible with a neoliberal mind-set, as Lazzarato 437 
(2009: 120) argues that while the entrepreneur is free, ‘the freedom of the worker and consumer… are 438 
made subordinate’.  439 
Control and resistance in the construction of Distrust   440 
So far, this article has conceptualised how neoliberalism could influence the design of policy and the 441 
creation of distrust. Such distrust fundamentally shapes relationships between various actors in the FE 442 
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sector. This has led to a leadership approach which has permeated the sector, characterised primarily 443 
by the ‘deliberate control of professionals, the introduction of business models… and the development 444 
of a managerial caste with its own value system’ (Gleeson and Shain 1999, cited in Stoten 2014: 512). 445 
The following section will attempt to explain how a high-distrust environment has legitimised and 446 
perpetuated the need to control individuals, but also how distrust can allow individuals to express 447 
their refusal of the status quo. The established norm of creating policy without consultation with any 448 
stakeholders serves to isolate those who are supposed to implement and carry out the policy (Keep 449 
2006, 2015). In such circumstances, new networks have emerged in response to, and often in 450 
ideological opposition to, those that create policy (Stoten 2014; Lewicki et al 2016). Therefore, it is 451 
necessary to conceptualise trust and distrust as a reciprocal process; in this case through the 452 
imposition of, and resistance to power.  453 
The distrust dilemma in the mitigation of risk 454 
The pressure on school and college leaders to exercise control over their staff has been eloquently 455 
demonstrated in Coffield’s (2017) work on the role and impact of Ofsted upon teaching practice on 456 
the English education system. Buoyed by the oft-quoted assertion from the inspectorate that ‘the most 457 
important factor in improving standards is leadership (Coffield 2017: 11), leaders use the 458 
responsibility they are charged with the deliver ‘standards’ to shape teaching practice. We can 459 
perceive the act of distrusting not only increases control, but in the worst cases uses fear to support it 460 
(ibid). Distrust effectively permits the legitimate pursuit of excessive control of those further down the 461 
power structure, an approach which was found to be prominent in Stoten’s (2014) research into 462 
leadership style in FE.  463 
Further, the logic of individualism and competition inherent within a neoliberal environment allows 464 
those in positions of power to account for problems in the education system to an individual, or set of 465 
individuals. The workings of this logic can be seen in practice through the activity of the FE 466 
Commissioner, ‘intervening’ in colleges who have failed to meet the required standard. This logic 467 
dictates that those who succeed within the neoliberal environment are ‘virtuous’ (De Lissovoy 2018), 468 
whilst those who fail or object are without virtue.  469 
In such an environment, leadership within individual FE institutions are presented with a dilemma. As 470 
Boocock (2011: 417) notes, for example:  471 
‘an overemphasis on self-governance and open systems would allow productive potential… 472 
but might also lead to free-riding and to a lack of regard for the goals of government. 473 
Conversely an over focus on the hierarchy… might direct self-interested college agents to the 474 
goals of governance at the expense of innovation…’ 475 
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This conundrum provides us with a link back to Page’s (2017) assertion at the start of this paper that 476 
the external environment forces the hand of college governors and leadership teams when making 477 
decisions. While the effect of distrust is to curb creativity, autonomy and agency (Boocock 2011; 478 
O’Leary and Wood 2017; Thompson and Wolstencroft 2018), trusting represents much higher 479 
perceived risks which threaten intervention and observation by various arms of government. 480 
Conversely, policies of distrust are risk-averse, safe, and do not tolerate deviance (Hill 2000; Coffield 481 
2017; Boocock 2011). A study by Thompson and Wolstencroft (2018) found that various ‘control 482 
mechanisms’ were utilised such as micro management, interference, constant judgement, 483 
unreasonable demands and excessive monitoring by senior leaders in order to establish conformity. 484 
As such, it was control that allowed leaders to better predict the likely positive outcome in an 485 
environment which faces the constant threat of audit. In the act of withdrawing trust, or threatening to 486 
withdraw trust, the ‘threat of removal is used as a sanction and a control mechanism’ (Skinner, Dietz, 487 
and Weibel 2014: 216).  488 
Control is required when risk is high, reflecting Page's (2017b: 2-3) understanding that ‘the 489 
proliferation of teacher surveillance, from learning walks to parental networks is driven by a 490 
preoccupation with risk… [the need to] know the future as if it has already passed’. O’Leary and 491 
Wood (2017) have further observed that even though OFSTED no longer grade individual teachers 492 
(Ofsted 2018), college leadership teams in many cases continue to grade individuals due to the 493 
‘deeply engrained practice’ of observation. This demonstrates how difficult rebuilding trust can be, 494 
once it has been lost. As a result, policies of distrust successfully control behaviour through fear of 495 
consequences (Gleeson, Davies, and Wheeler 2005).  496 
The instruments used by leadership teams such as audit, observation and performance management 497 
work to undermine the values of individual actors in the system by encouraging them to work towards 498 
extrinsic rather than intrinsic goals (Boocock 2017). Boocock (2017: 301) has further argued that the 499 
apparatus of distrust also shapes the behaviour of leadership teams, as the pressure to ‘conform to 500 
central policy diktats’ has been at the expense of ‘senior manager agency and local decision making’. 501 
He concluded that this has effectively shut down the availability of critical spaces for effective 502 
reflection on quality (Boocock 2011) and open governance (Boocock 2017). The insecurity inherent 503 
in the competitive environment therefore induces anxiety into both institutions and individuals as they 504 
are made ‘responsible for the conditions they confront and for their ultimate destinies in this context’ 505 
(De Lissovoy 2018: 23). Anxiety, as expressed by De Lissovoy (2018) names the tension inherent in 506 
the system and the potential crises of institutions within a free-market environment, which exists to 507 
create winners and losers.   508 
Reciprocal Distrust as a form of ideological resistance  509 
The palpable lack of trust has led some educationalists to seek solace in those who share the same 510 
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values as they do. The perceived ‘logic’ of incorporation as a means of control has neglected the 511 
values which many teaching staff hold dear (Lucas and Crowther 2016). The response has been in 512 
some cases to reciprocate the distrust they experience based on a lack of mutually shared values. 513 
Smith (2007) has argued that commonly shared goals and values associated with their practice such as 514 
social justice and community empowerment (often centred around localised knowledge) is 515 
inconsistent with the values of NPM. Therefore, the desire to form cross-institutional networks such 516 
as ‘Tutor Voices’ (a network of further education college lecturers who founded a forum in which 517 
best practice could be debated and shared) in resistance to ‘untrustworthy’ leadership and government 518 
functions as a symbolic refusal to trust the system in which they find themselves. In doing so they 519 
can, to some extent, reclaim their identity and exercise their agency to believe and act differently to 520 
the status quo (Petrie 2015). This reflects what (Ball 2016: 1139) might refer to as the ‘politics of 521 
refusal’ in which ‘speaking plainly when there is a difference in power between the speaker and the 522 
listener [and] speaking frankly even when it flies in the face of the prevailing discourse’ becomes 523 
paramount in the assertion of an identity (individual or collective) which reflects an outright 524 
opposition to the accepted practices of NPM in public education.  525 
Counter-narratives of resistance and resilience in the face of significant financial and political 526 
challenges are abundant in the literature (see Daley, Orr, and Petrie 2015 for examples of subversion 527 
in FE). Indeed, Coffield et al (2007: 728) remind us that ‘policy makers are not writing upon a blank 528 
slate, but on a page already made up of ‘ecologies of practice’…and as such the hereditary values of 529 
the adult education movement remain evident in pockets of the sector (Field 2006). Mycroft (2016: 530 
419) invites us to consider that ‘as neoliberalism tightens its hold, possibly its death grip… as 531 
educators we can seize this [opportunity to resist through practice] or let it happen to us’. The 532 
somewhat binary nature of Mycroft’s proposal is demonstrative of a withdrawn faith from the ‘led’ 533 
towards leadership. This practice of refusal makes explicit the ‘unwelcome trust’ given to them by 534 
those in power. According to Skinner et al (2014: 214), ‘unwelcome trust’ is ‘the reluctance to be 535 
trusted’ for a variety of reasons including when ‘the pressures of obligation may be intolerable… 536 
counter to their interests… or personal ethics’. In this way, active distrust towards those in power 537 
serves as a form of ideological resistance; making explicit who, and who is not, within the realm of 538 
their ‘moral space’, to borrow from Sztompka (2017).  539 
This resistance, or reciprocal distrust, represents the fractured nature of institutional relations. It 540 
functions as ‘a rejection of comparison and improvement, and indeed of excellence’ (Ball 2016: 541 
1141). This kind of resistance represents what Lewicki et al (1998: 9) would refer to as a ‘low trust-542 
high distrust’ disposition towards authority. This involves relationships where negative outcomes are 543 
‘expected and feared’, harmful motives are assumed and as such pre-emptive actions are required. 544 
This disposition towards leadership is perpetuated by the perception that those who are not part of the 545 
resistance are complicit in the oppression. This state of affairs between those that create policy, those 546 
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that implement policy and those that are subject to policy diminishes opportunities for trust repair; as 547 
each party continues to use strategies based upon distrust to protect their interests. As Page (2015: 548 
157) has reflected in previous work: ‘in the very act of subversiveness we concede the loss of what 549 
lies at the heart of being professional: autonomy, authority and trust’.  550 
The impact of reciprocal distrust between the key actors at play has resulted, to a greater or lesser 551 
extent, in an ideological stalemate. Lucas and Crowther (2016) have argued that neoliberal 552 
marketeering in FE has served to distract everyone in the field, resulting in what they refer to as 553 
‘unorganised social spaces’ where discussion of core values in the FE sector relating professionalism 554 
and curriculum have been neglected.  555 
Conclusion: Trust violated 556 
This paper sought to conceptualise the role that trust and distrust could play in the design and 557 
implementation of policy in the Further Education sector. In doing so, I have illustrated how 558 
Rothstein’s (2005) social trap phenomena can perpetuate policy churn, which manipulates institutions 559 
to conform to changing priorities based on a skills agenda; fuelled by national and global competition. 560 
Lewicki et al’s (1998) seminal work on the distinction between trust and distrust further aides us to 561 
understand how New Public Management practices necessitate a disposition of institutional distrust to 562 
verify employee compliance. Stzompka’s (2008) concept of ‘moral space’ allows us to understand 563 
how a lack of faith from leadership can lead to violations of trust which diminishes opportunities for 564 
organisational trust repair. Whilst this paper did not intend to make categorical statements around the 565 
deliberate use of distrust in this process, these theoretical concepts can support us to develop a deeper 566 
understanding of the utility of institutional and organisational distrust in manipulating behaviour 567 
within a homogenous policy environment; and how resistance to policy hegemony can result in 568 
withdrawn faith from leadership. In effect, this paper sought to answer the question ‘what if distrust 569 
was intentional? from a theoretical perspective. By exploring this question conceptually, this paper 570 
can directly address the violation of trust associated with the increased surveillance of teachers; which 571 
has reduced the scope for individual autonomy and creativity.  572 
The acceleration of policy initiatives since 1992 demonstrates a lack of trust in institutions to achieve 573 
success in the long term. Increased regulation it has, contrary to the rhetoric, reduced financial and 574 
curricula autonomy. By conceptualising the role that distrust might play in this process, this paper 575 
posits that over time a ‘social trap’ of reciprocal high distrust and conflict has been created; driven by 576 
the struggle to establish a sense of control on the part of the institution, or maintain a sense of 577 
autonomy on the part of the individual.  578 
This social trap increases individualism and reduces cooperation based on the general perception that 579 
others will also be uncooperative. The ‘stickiness’ of the problem (Uslaner 2002) is evident in the 580 
design and implementation of policy, which is subject to a perpetual sense of uncertainty and 581 
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instability. Hence, why the problem is such a ‘sticky’ one, as neither party has faith that they will 582 
work towards the common good, or the best interests of all concerned. Avis (2003) believes that trust 583 
is central to creative endeavour, yet it is absent from the organisational hierarchies that are typical of 584 
many further education institutions. He argues that risk-taking must take place in high-trust 585 
environments as “working conditions marked by hierarchical and segmented relations will fail 586 
to…lend themselves to creative endeavour” (Avis 2003: 320)  587 
I have demonstrated in this paper that control-for-predictability is a form of policy-making with deep 588 
(intended or unintended) consequences. Within the context of FE, the constant state of flux in the 589 
policy environment prevents trust from flourishing. If we can understand that trust has been violated 590 
by acts of distrust caused by the ‘indominatable power’ of the external environment (Page 2017), we 591 
can also understand why these acts may be perceived as necessary by leaders within Further 592 
Education Colleges. Therefore, distrust constitutes useful mechanism to manipulate behaviour and 593 
ensure policy conformity. 594 
However, Sztompka (2017: 8) contends that if ‘trust engenders security, predictability, readiness to 595 
initiate interactions and take risks, then distrust produces suspiciousness and anxiety which are 596 
paralysing for actions and interactions’. Therefore, although the perceived benefits of distrust may 597 
result in institutional conformity, the repeated violations of trust described in this paper have served to 598 
undermine the moral bonds of respect, solidarity and justice to the extent that an ideological stalemate 599 
has been created between those that create policy (government), those that implement policy (FECs), 600 
and those that are subject to policy (staff and students). This can be understood as maintained, even 601 
strengthened, through Rothstein’s (2005) social trap phenomena. These violations of trust threaten an 602 
individual’s sense of ‘existential safety’ (Sztompka 2017) and have therefore served to make FECs 603 
unsafe spaces to work, necessitating a meaningful resistance in which those involved may feel their 604 
‘moral space’ will be respected, where their institutions fail to do so.  605 
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